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Frans N. Stokman, Marcel A.L.M. van Assen, 
Jelle van der Knoop, and Reinier C.H. van Oosten * 
- --: *-1 
-,. .->q 
ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces a methodology for strategic intervention in collective aeclsion 
making. The methodology is based on (1) a decomposition of the problem into a few 
main controversial issues, (2) systematic interviews of subject area specialists to 
obtain a specification of the decision setting, consisting of a list of stakeholders with 
their capabilities, positions, and salience on each of the issues; (3) computer simula- 
tion. The computer simulation models incorporate only the main processes through 
which differences in positions and salience are accommodated in binding decisions: 
management of meaning through the provision of convincing information, chal- 
lenges, and exchanges. The methodology generates insights into the likely outcomes 
of the process, the amount of conflict involved, and the stability of the outcomes. 
These insights and the investigation of the effects of strategic moves provide major 
strategic advantages to the user. This is likely to lead to a better representation of the 
user's own position in the decision outcome and the creation of a broader political 
and social support behind the decision outcome. 
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Collective decision making is one of the most fundamental processes in society. 
People's long-term common interests often require binding decisions for their 
successful accomplishment. Whenever all people strive toward the same outcome 
there is no problem. They can simply turn the preferred outcome into a decision 
and act accordingly. Collective decision making becomes difficult when stake- 
holders take different positions and express different preferences with respect to 
the outcome. Then, the different positions have to be accommodated in one way 
or the other. The dynamics in the decision-making process result from the fact that 
each stakeholder, with different intensity and potential, attempts to realize his2 
position whereas only one outcome can be chosen. 
Small informal groups can often make decisions on the basis of informal rules 
and agreements. As soon as common interests become more complex and groups 
larger, collective decision making has to be institutionalized through the elabora- 
tion of generally accepted decision-making procedures. Such formal procedures 
can be found at all levels of society. They specify, among other things, which bod- 
ies have the authority to make the final decisions, how these bodies are composed 
and their members selected, and which stakeholders at what moment have to be 
heard or are otherwise involved in the decision making. In addition, rules specify 
procedures for appeal against decisions that are harmful or not made according 
the required procedures. 
In the social sciences, models for collective decision making have been devel- 
oped since the early eighties that provide far-reaching insights into collective 
decision-making situations (among others, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1985; Cole- 
man 1990; Laumann et al. 1987; Stokman and Van den Bos 1992; Stokman and 
Van Oosten 1994; Torenvlied 1996; Konig 1997; Pappi and Henning 1998). 
Game theoretical insights are combined with mathematical models and computer 
simulation to model essential collective decision-making processes. The models 
represent three processes that precede formal decision making and that affect the 
final positions of the stakeholders involved. First, position changes are sometimes 
induced because stakeholders receive or provide new convincing information 
rather to take other positions (management of meaning). Second, in other situa- 
tions stakeholders feel challenged by others to change their positions because the 
losses incurred by losing such a challenge are larger than the losses incurred by 
defending their position. Finally, stakeholders may change their positions when 
they see possibilities to create win-win situations through exchanging (logroll- 
ing). 
All models require a limited set of data obtained through interviews with sub- 
ject area specialists. The models generate information on the outcome, the type of 
process, and the amount of conflict to be expected. The aim of the models is two- 
fold. First, the models are used for the analysis of decision-making processes and 
for the prediction of decision outcomes without intervention. On the basis of a 
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large number of evaluation studies of mostly political decisions at the interna- 
tional, national, and local level (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994; Ray and 
Russett 1996; Stokman and Berveling 1998; Rojer 1999; Payne 1999), it can be 
concluded that the models are quite a~cura te .~  Second, the models are particularly 
useful for intervention in decision making in order to optimize the utility of one 
stakeholder, to create sufficient support for a decision, or to arrive at a fair deci- 
sion on the basis of mediation. These strategically oriented applications are 
mainly applications for large organizations and governmental agencies. They 
prove the usefulness of the models for obtaining direct strategic insights and for 
intervention in ongoing decision-making processes. 
The models depart from a systematic analysis of the decision-making situation 
which is useful in itself. Such a systematic approach involves at first a decompo- 
sition of the problem resulting in the specification of a limited number of main 
controversial issues to be solved. Subsequently, an analysis of all stakeholders is 
required, including an overview of their positions, capabilities, and salience on 
each of the issues. Next, different strategies have to be considered. Computer sim- 
ulation models are particularly useful for evaluating these strategies. We will 
elaborate each of these elements. 
THE DECOMPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM INTO 
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES 
The first essential step in a strategic decision-making analysis is the specification 
of the problem at stake in terms of a limited number of issues on which decisions 
have to be made. Each issue can be seen as a major controversial point for deci- - 
sion. Decisions of the stakeholders on the specified set of issues should determine 
the contours of the chosen solution. Usually, one to five issues are sufficient, even 
in complicated situations, but incidentally up to 20 issues have been used in some 
applications. The requirement of the specification of a limited number of issues is 
in its own right a good exercise to distinguish main from subordinate points. 
Ill-defined specification at this stage implies a possible solution to something that 
has little impact on the actual problem. Misspecification of the issues is the main 
cause of the failures in model predictions. 
An important aid in the specification of issues is the requirement that at least the 
two extreme positions on each issue should be identified. Identification of the two 
extreme positions actually implies that an issue can be seen as unidimensional, a 
straight line on which different positions can be 10cated.~ Intermediate positions 
indicate more moderate positions, but also possible compromise outcomes. If 
extreme and possible intermediate positions cannot be ordered, the specification 
of the issues is wrong, for example, because more underlying issues are involved. 
In such cases it is recommended to go one step deeper and to identify the under- 
lying dimensions. 
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If we, for example, aim to analyze the merger of two companies, typical issues ' 
are the premium to be paid for the other company above the market or shares 
value, the desired degree of integration of the two companies, the initial number 
of representatives of each company in the integrated board, the timing of the 
merger, and which of the two presidents will be nominated as the president of the 
merged company. The last issue is an example of a dichotomous issue without 
intermediate outcomes. Often, such issues are most difficult to solve, as no com- 
promises are possible. Whenever possible, it is therefore advisable to integrate 
such issues with other issues, facilitating, for example, a solution through an 
exchange with other issues (e.g., the initial number of representatives in the 
board). 
A decomposition of the problem also implies at least a provisional specification 
of the main stakeholders. Without such a specification it will be difficult to spec- 
ify extreme and intermediate positions. Stakeholders can be individuals or organi- 
zations. Individuals usually represent organizations or hold important positions in 
organizations. 
CAPABILITIES, POSITIONS, AND SALIENCE 
After specifying the issues, the stakeholders, and the different possible positions 
on the issues, the next step in a strategic decision analysis consists of the specifi- 
cation of three characteristics of each stakeholder in relation to each issue. These 
data are usually obtained in interviews with one or two experts who make esti- 
mates relating to all stakeholders. The experts should have a good overview of the 
whole decision-making setting. Numerical specifications are required in the mod- 
els. 
An example of such a numerical specification is given in Table 1. The example 
originates in a project carried out by a transition manager from the Dutch com- 
pany W&S Transition and Interim Management. W&S was asked to reorganize a 
company in the Amsterdam harbor that was facing serious economic problems. 
The company, given the acronym ABC, had a strong ideological orientation and 
had to accept more projects on economic grounds in order to survive. Maintaining 
the present ideological orientation was highly controversial. Some stakeholders 
wanted it to be reduced, whereas others wanted its continuation or even strength- 
ening. We specified the central issue of the ideological orientation as the percent- 
age of projects that the company would be allowed to accept on ideological 
grounds after the reorganization. 
The second column of Table 1 gives the positions of the stakeholders on the 
issue. The range is between 0 percent for competitors to 100 percent for the trade 
unions. The transition manager, the chairman of the supervisory board, and the 
economically oriented faction in the board took the rather radical position of 10 
percent. Several other intermediate positions were also taken. 
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t Table I .  Example of a Specification of an Issue and 
the Capabilities, Positions and Saliences of the Stakeholders 
Issue: ldeological Orientation 
Capabilities Position Salience 
0.1 5 70 0.2 Ideological faction in the Supervisory Board 
0.1 5 10 0.3 Economically oriented faction in the Supervisory Board 
0.30 40 0.3 Managing director 
0.30 80 0.4 Deputy director 
0.1 5 80 0.2 Administrator 
0.1 5 90 0.3 Project leaders 
0.30 30 0.3 Managers of commercially oriented departments 
0.20 70 0.4 Managers of ideologically oriented departments 
0.70 100 0.1 Trade unions 
0.40 80 0.1 Municipality of Amsterdam 
0.60 50 0.4 Employee Board 
0.80 10 0.9 Transition manager 
0.10 50 0.2 Accountant 
1 .OO 10 0.9 Chairman of the Supervisory Board 
0.1 0 0 0.2 Competitors 
Note: Position: Percentage of projects with an ideological orientation. 
The interests of the stakeholders are not only represented in the positions they' 
take, but also in the degree to which they are interested in the issue. We denote 
this as the salience of the issue for the stakeholder. The salience indicates the will- 
ingness of the stakeholder to push his position in the decision making. If the issue 
is hardly related to essential interests of a stakeholder, he will hardly fight for an 
outcome close to his position and he is to be expected to compromise quickly. If 
the issues are related closely to his main interests, a stakeholder will put all avail- 
able clout behind his position and he is unlikely to compromise quickly. In the 
table, salience is scored on a scale from 0 (not related to own interests) to 1 (the 
stakeholder is willing to go to the limit). The transition manager was hired to 
transform the company into an economically viable one. As the success of his task 
depended strongly on his success on this issue, the issue was very salient to him. 
In other words, he had a strong interest in the outcome. The chairman of the super- 
visory board hired the transition manager and had committed himself to make the 
company economically viable. For him too, success on this issue was highly 
important. Failing would probably have cost him his chairmanship. The other 
stakeholders took other positions but were also less committed to them. 
In the literature and in practice it is often forgotten that the combination of posi- 
tion and salience determines the behavior of stakeholders. These combinations are 
generated by the incentive structures of stakeholders. If one of the two is over- 
looked (in practice often salience), serious miscalculations are inevitable. 
The third element is the capabilities of the stakeholders to co-determine the out- 
come. This refers to a potential, not the actual mobilization of the capabilities. 
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Formal discretional or voting power is an important capability to co-determine the ' 
outcome of decisions. Nevertheless, people with the authority to make the final 
decision do not do so in isolation without taking into consideration the interests of 
the other stakeholders. If they were to neglect the interests of others, their deci- 
sions would quickly provoke societal and political opposition, resulting in the 
undermining of their own authority and legitimacy. Apart from that, most deci- 
sion makers lack the required expertise to decide themselves and have to rely 
heavily on experts and advisors who are often strongly committed themselves. In 
addition, decision makers often need the cooperation of others for the implemen- 
tation of their decisions, for example for the required financial resources or for 
loyal implementation. Other capabilities, therefore, result from exclusive exper- 
tise and information, financial resources or the capability to mobilize a large num- 
ber of people. Scaling capabilities therefore requires the addition of things that are 
difficult to compare. Nevertheless, experts are often able to provide such a scale. 
During the extraction procedure, a "1" is often assigned to the stakeholder with 
the largest capabilities. Subsequently, the capabilities of the others are related to 
the one with the highest capabilities and to the capabilities of each other. Additiv- 
ity is assumed here. If, for example, two stakeholders form a coalition against a 
third, their joint capabilities are compared with those of the third to determine 
which of them is stronger. When a subject area specialist tries to construct such a 
scale, it is important to make many such comparisons, that is, to compare many 
opposing coalitions of different compositions and sizes. 
Capabilities and salience together determine the effective power of stakehold- 
ers. Salience can be interpreted as the fraction of capabilities that a stakeholder is 
20 aQ 8 05 ,o0 
Position 
Figure I .  Capabilities and Effective Power on tne rosltron scale 
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willing to mobilize to effectuate his position in the outcome of the decision. A 
graphic showing the distribution of capabilities and effective power over the 
positions often generates much insight in the decision-making setting. Figure 1 
contains an example of such a graphic for the data in Table 1. Two aspects 
become clear immediately: a large amount of capabilities was concentrated 
behind the 10 percent position and almost all of that potential was mobilized. The 
latter was not true on the other side of the continuum. There, only a small fraction 
of the capabilities was mobilized. This immediately leads to the conclusion that 
the transition manager (who had the position of 10 percent) had to avoid a 
strongly confrontational strategy because this would have had the danger of 
mobilizing a countervailing power. If that had happened in this example, it would 
also have resulted in a bipolar distribution of effective power over the continuum. 
Such issues are often difficult to resolve in contrast to issues where the power 
distribution is unimodal. %. 
PROCESSES AND STRATEGIES 
The dynamics of decision making result mainly from the efforts of stakeholders 
to realize an outcome of the decision that is as close as possible to their own posi- 
tion. The first and most obvious target for these efforts are the positions of the 
other stakeholders: is it possible to move their positions toward one's own, thus 
building an effective coalition behind one's own position? Building such a coali- 
tion makes it more likely that final decision makers will shift their positions, 
resulting in a decision closer to one's own position. A characteristic of collective 
decision-making processes is that not only one stakeholder attempts to build sup- 
port for his own position, but that they all do, thus provoking countervailing 
forces with the possibility that the coalition behind one's own position is not 
strengthened but weakened. An analysis of a particular strategy might even result 
in the insight that one's own position cannot be maintained whereas the aim was 
to build a strong coalition behind it. 
There are three main processes through which a stakeholder changes his posi- 
tion: he receives convincing information implying that another position reflects 
his incentive structure better (management of meaning); he feels more or less 
forced to change his position because others challenge his position; or he is pre- 
pared to take another position in exchange for a favorable (for him) move by 
another stakeholder on another issue. In management of meaning and challenge 
processes, in principle at least, only one issue is involved, whereas in exchange 
more issues are always involved. We therefore consider management of meaning 
and challenge processes first. The three processes are also points of departure for 
individual strategies and we will therefore also consider them from this perspec- 
tive in the next sections. 
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Management of Meaning Processes and Strategies 
In management of meaning processes convincing information plays a dominant 
role (Weick 1979; O'Reilly 1983; Bouwen 1993). As stated above, the position 
and salience of a stakeholder are connected to his incentive structure. The more 
directly an issue is connected to the central higher ordered objectives of a stake- 
holder and the more an issue is seen as an important condition for their realization, 
the more salient the issue is to him. His position on the issue corresponds to the 
outcome of the decision that he sees as optimal for the realization of his objec- 
tives. It does not matter what his higher ordered objectives are or where they come 
from. They may be related to the goals of the organization he represents or they 
may be related to his personal goals, such as status and behavioral confirmation, 
or to a combination of these. His own perception of the salience of the issue and 
the best outcome (position) in terms of these higher ordered objectives is essen- 
tial. New information can drastically change this perception of salience and best 
position only if the new information is seen as reliable and is accepted as relevant. 
Two conditions substantially increase the likelihood that this will happen and, 
consequently, determine the success of convincing information strategies. 
First, convincing new information is generally more easily accepted in earlier 
stages of the decision making than in the later ones. During the decision-making 
process, positions taken by the stakeholders tend to freeze. In the beginning, 
stakeholders often do not have very crystallized ideas about the connection 
between the issue and their objectives. They are relatively open to information 
that clarifies that connection. 
Second, a substantial amount of trust in the provider of the information 
increases the likelihood that information is accepted as relevant and reliable. Trust 
will be greater if the provider has proven to be reliable in the past and if the pro- 
vider can be expected to experience future negative consequences of providing 
distorted or incomplete information. This "shadow of the future" (Axelrod 1984) 
is more effective if the provider of distorted information loses his reputation not 
only with respect to the recipient stakeholder but also with respect to others (Raub 
and Weesie 1990; Buskens 1999). Trust will also be greater if the information is 
less related to central interests of the provider. These conditions for trust emerge 
more readily among like-minded stakeholders and among stakeholders who also 
meet each other in other contexts, than among stakeholders with conflicting inter- 
ests. Stakeholders also tend to assign more weight to the opinion of powerful 
stakeholders, whereas powerful stakeholders tend to listen more to one another 
than to less powerful ones (Molm 1997; Stokman and Zeggelink 1996).~ In gen- 
eral, convincing information strategies do not work well or sufficiently in relation 
to strongly polarized issues (see Figure 1) and in situations with huge power dif- 
ferences. Misuse of trust strongly reduces the effectiveness of convincing infor- 
mation strategies in the future. In decision-making processes this should not only 
be a guideline for one's own behavior, but can be made unequivocally clear to 
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others, thus reducing their inclination to provide distorted or incomplete informa- 
tion. 
In the context of convincing information strategies it is important to take 
account of the fact that people tend to be myopic in two respects. First, short-term 
benefits and costs weigh stronger than long-term ones, otherwise nobody would 
smoke, nor would obligatory retirement arrangements be necessary (Lindenberg 
1998). Second, stakeholders tend to see small differences around their own posi- 
tion much sharper than differences among remote positions (Bauer at al. 1963). 
This may result in strong trust crises in one's own coalition about differences of 
opinion that outsiders would classify as being of minor importance. 
Challenge Processes and Strategies 
In challenge processes differences in power and salience play an important role. 
To the degree that the salience of the issue to oneself is lower and the power dom- 
inance of stakeholders who support other position is larger, one will be inclined to 
give up his own position. Unnecessary costs are saved by conceding a position on 
an issue that is only marginally related to one's own interests. In challenge pro- 
cesses power dominance relations are more important than arguments. The pro- 
cess is therefore represented in the form of a noncooperative game (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 1985; Bueno de Mesquita 1994). A challenge is more likely to be ' 
successful to the degree that the salience of the other stakeholder is lower and the 
support for the other's position is lower relative to the support for one's own posi- 
tion. In the computer simulation these two aspects dominate the determination of 
which stakeholder will challenge which other stakeholder (see Figure 2). Each 
stakeholder makes this choice in relation to each of the other stakeholders. Based 
on the challenges made, each stakeholder has a set of cards in his hands that rep- 
resent the challenges made and received. If he received challenges, he has to draw 
the one that is best for him. The result is either conflict (if he made a challenge to 
the other as well) or a forced position change. These position changes create a 
new decision-making setting (iteration in the computer simulation model). In that 
new setting the stakeholders repeat the choice process. This continues until none 
of the stakeholders move anymore (substantially) or until all stakeholders take the 
same position. The latter does not occur often but it does in the example of Table 
1. Table 2 shows how the decision making evolves on the issue of the ideological 
orientation of the company. The first column gives the original positions of the 
stakeholders as the subject area specialist provided them (see Table 1). The sec- 
ond column shows that (in the computer simulation) some stakeholders had to 
adapt their position because of the challenges obtained. Almost all movements are 
in the direction of the 10 percent position. After the first round or iteration the sup- 
port for that position increases substantially, resulting in a still stronger movement 
in that direction. In iteration four all stakeholders take that position. In reality, 
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consensus emerged around that position, notwithstanding the very controversial 
nature of the issue at the beginning. 
For challenge strategies to be successful at least three elements have to be con- 
sidered explicitly. The first involves the choice of one's own position at the begin- 
ning of the decision-making process. Will a more extreme position result in a 
better outcome (closer to one's own position or an outcome with a larger amount 
of political and social support) or is it better to choose for a more moderate posi- 
tion? The same holds for the leverage a stakeholder shows to othersS6 Is it better 
to push with all available clout or will a less involved stance to better results? If 
decision-making processes were to evolve monotonically, a more extreme posi- 
tion and a higher leverage would always lead to a better result, but this is not the 
case. The main reason is that individuals behave differently in loss situations than 
in gain situations, both in individual decision making (e.g., Kahneman and Tver- 
sky 1979) and in collective action in social dilemma situations (Raub and Snijders 
1997; Van Assen 1998). In loss situations individuals are more willing to accept 
risks, whereas they tend to be more risk averse in gain situations. If a stakeholder 
confronts his adversaries with a strong loss situation by taking an extreme posi- 
tion and showing a high leverage, his adversaries tend to become more risk seek- 
ing and resisting. The consequence may well be that he loses support for his 
position and that he has to accept a worse outcome. These effects are also incor- 
porated in the simulation model and can be evaluated systematically. If, for exam- 
ple, the transition manager in the example of Table 1 had chosen for the position 
Existing Policv 2 Challenge Existing Policy 
Policy 
Worsens \ Challenger 
Source: Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1985 
Figure 2. The Challenge Process 
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Table 2. Example of Evolution of Challenge Process (Computer Simulation) 
Positions in iterations 
lteration lteration lteration lteration 
Initial 1 2 3 4 
Ideological faction in the Supervisory Board 





Managers of commercially oriented depts. 
Managers of ideologically oriented depts. 
Trade unions 




Chairman of the Supervisory Board 
Competitors 
of 0 percent, the predicted outcome would still be 10 percent. However, unanim- 
ity would then only have been reached after six iterations with a larger amount of 
conflict. This would have also resulted in a lower prestige for the transition man- 
ager, as the computer simulation shows he would have had to move from 0 to 10 
percent in the fifth iteration. 
In addition to an explicit reflection on one's own position and leverage, an 
explicit evaluation of the likelihood of success of challenges is recommended. If 
a stakeholder takes an extreme minority position, his own chances of successful 
challenges are likely underestimated (resulting in no or less challenges) for the 
same reason as above: there is a tendency to overestimate the risks stakeholders 
close to the expected outcome are likely to take. As they are in a gain situation, 
stakeholders with positions close to the expected outcome are reluctant to make 
challenges and are an easier target than stakeholders with extreme minority posi- 
tions expect. The simulation model provides insight into such likely mispercep- 
tions of stakeholders and their effect on the outcome of the decision. Repeatedly, 
these misperceptions have been shown to exist in reality and their analysis has 
increased success rates considerably (Ray and Russett 1996). 
Exchange Processes and Strategies 
In exchange processes contrasting interests play a dominant role. Contrasting 
interests manifest themselves in a combination of fundamental differences in 
positions and salience over different issues. Whereas management of meaning 
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Table 3. Position Exchange Possibilities 
lssue 2 
Le A Right 
lssue 1 Left 
Right 
strategies are effective among like-minded stakeholders, exchanges of positions 
are most profitable between stakeholders who have (1) opposing positions on the 
issues and (2) very different patterns of salience. The latter means that one stake- 
holder is mainly interested in one issue, whereas the other issue is strongly related 
to higher objectives of the other stakeholder. The result of a position exchange 
between two stakeholders is that they shift their voting position in the direction of 
the other on the issue that is relatively more salient for the other. In this way they 
create a win-win situation. 
Table 3 describes exchange possibilities in terms of positions held by the stake- 
holders. Exchange possibilities exist between stakeholders who hold opposing 
positions on both issues, that is, are located at different sides of the expected out- 
come on both issues. From this perspective we distinguish four groups of stake- 
holders. Stakeholders in group A are located on the left side of the expected 
outcome on both issues, stakeholders in group D on the right side. They have 
opposing interests on both issues and are therefore important potential exchange 
partners. The same holds for the groups B and C. As A and B have the same posi- 
tion on the first issue, they cannot exchange. A and C cannot exchange as they 
have the same position on the second issue. Similar arguments hold for the groups 
C and D, and B and D. 
Stakeholders from two groups with opposing positions can profit from position 
exchange if the relative salience of the two issues for each of them is different 
(Stokman and Van Oosten 1994)? A position exchange is then profitable for both, 
but has also important side effects for others. This can be seen clearly in Figure 3. 
Assume a stakeholder from group D attaches relatively more salience to issue 1 
than to issue 2 if we compare his saliences with those of a stakeholder in group A. 
Then issue 1 is D's demand issue and A's supply issue. Position exchange 
between A and D implies that A is willing to shift his position on issue 1 in the 
direction of D, whereas D does the same on issue 2. If they do, they both shift 
away from B in the direction of C on both issues. B is thus punished doubly and 
C rewarded doubly, while none of the two is engaged in the exchange. If issue 1 
would have been A's demand issue, C would have been punished twice and B 
rewarded twice. 
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Exchanges can also be threatening for internal group cohesion. Threats emerge 
when stakeholders in a group differ in their prioritization of the issues. We con- 
sider again two potential exchange groups, for example A and D. Assume that 
there are two stakeholders in group A, Al and A2 (see Figure 4). Assume also that 
the salience of issue 2 for Al relative to issue 1 is higher than that for the stake- 
holders in group D, while the reverse is true for A2. Then D can split group A. For 
A,, issue 1 is the supply issue on which he is prepared to shift his position in the 
direction of D. In contrast, A2 wants to maintain his position on issue 1 and is pre- 
pared to shift his position on issue 2 in the direction of D. If D were to exchange 
with both, the effect would be that D shifts on both issues in the direction of A, 
and that Al and A2 differ in their positions on both issues (see Figure 4). It can be 
shown that D creates a prisoner's dilemma for Al and A2 where both Al and A2 
are better off not exchanging at all (Van Assen et al. forthcoming). 
The representation of exchanges used in our models is fundamentally different 
from the representation used in most social exchange theory literature. The repre- 
sentation of exchanges we use is similar to that used by Coleman (e.g., 1972, 
1990) who also represents both actors' interests in goods and the goods actors 
possess. In network exchange theory the division of a common resource pool 
(e.g., Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992; Cook and Yamagishi 1992; Friedkin 1992; 
Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988; Skvoretz and Willer 1993) is used to repre- 
sent exchanges. Van Assen (forthcoming) demonstrates that the often-used divi- 
sion of a common resource pool is generally not a theoretically valid 
representation of exchanges. 
All solutions proposed for the exchange rate in the literature can be applied to 
both our representation and the representation in terms of the division of a com- 
mon resource pool. Stokman and Van Oosten (1994) use an equal utility gain for 
both exchange partners. This has the advantage that exchanges have the same util- 
ity for both partners and can be handled in order of attractiveness to both. The dis- 
advantage is that it involves an intersubjective comparison of utility, which is 
theoretically unattractive. For our representation of exchanges two solutions of 
the exchange rate have been derived that are independent of the utility scale: the 
Nash solution (Achterkarnp 1999; Van Assen forthcoming), and the 
Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky (RKS) solution (Van Assen forthcoming). There is a 
strong link between our work and network exchange theory because 
exchange-resistance solution used in network exchange theory (e.g., Willer, 
Markovsky, and Patton 1988; Skvoretz and Willer 1993; Willer and Szmatka 
1995) is also derived from the game theoretical RKS solution (Heckathorn 1980). 
Van Oosten (forthcoming) bases the exchange rate on satisficing adaptation of 
random rates. 
A difference between our work and work in network exchange theory is that the 
latter until now only deals with exchanges of private goods. This is also the start- 
ing point for Coleman's models and his generalizations to public goods are not 
straightforward (Stokman and Van Oosten 1994). We, however, investigate 
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exchanges of voting positions with externalities for other actors. A change in vot- 
ing position affects all stakeholders in collective decision making. Interestingly, 
network effects on exchanges and their rates in social exchange theory are com- 
pletely different from these effects in exchanges of goods with externalities to 
other actors (Van Assen et al. forthcoming). 
In exchange processes, three elements have to be considered explicitly when 
formulating one's own stance. The first concerns the selection of the issues one 
wants to include in the exchange process. Of course, one cannot always determine 
this alone, but there are many situations in which this is possible, for example, 
through the order in which different issues are negotiated. The second is the 
change one incorporates deliberately into one's own positions. Change will in 
general be incorporated in the less salient issues and is designed to facilitate con- 
cessions during an exchange. One should of course realize that extreme positions 
could provoke extremity on the other side, which easily nullifies the positive 
effect by resulting in more conflict and tension. The third element concerns one's 
prioritization of the issues, the distribution of the leverage over the issues that one 
shows. Here too a certain balance is needed. If one shows too much leverage on' 
highly salient issues, one has to give in a lot on the other issues to obtain a position 
shift by the other stakeholders (it is generally known that in social relations, the 
person most interested in the relation tends to be exploited (Blau 1964). If one 
does not show enough leverage on highly salient issues, one's own position and 
salience may well not be discerned by others, giving them an opportunity to move 
lssue 1 
Issue 2 
Figure 3. Effects of Exchanges for Third Stakeholders 
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After two exchanges both Al and A2 have changed their position. 
Figure 4. Effects of Differences in Prioritization within Croups 
the issue aside and to maintain the status quo. If one shows too quickly that one is 
not really interested in less salient issues, the proposal to shift one's own position 
on these issues may well not be seen as a serious concession that justifies a move 
on another issue by the other stakeholder. 
An Example of a Combined Strategy 
Table 4 contains an example of how different strategies can be combined to 
determine which issues should be included in the exchange process in order to 
obtain an optimal outcome. The example is derived from an application in the 
context of Dutch labor negotiations. The main issue concerned a fundamental 
change in social benefit rights. The data were collected just before the start of the 
negotiations. In the row "Position" the positions of the client at the start of the 
negotiations are given. The client aimed at an obligatory start of the new system 
for all employees younger than a certain age (position 100). The other stakehold- 
ers aimed at an obligatory start only for new employees (position 70) or no new 
system at all (position 0; status quo). The positions 70 or 0 would imply consider- 
able delay or no change at all. A second important issue in the new regulation con- 
cerned a certain degree of freedom for the employees to adapt the new system to 
their own wishes (in Table 4 denoted "Introduction of Choice Elements"). The 
client was for a large amount of freedom (position loo), while the other parties 
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Table 4. Effects of Different Strategies in Labor Negotiations 
Position 
Outcome before 
Exchange, No Optimization 
Challenge at Main 
Issue, Rest through Exchange 
Best Exchange on 
First Three Issues 
Exchange without 
Alternative Exchange lssue 
Exchange without Choice 
Exchange 
Main lssue Guarantee lssue 












All Issues Included in Exchange 100 70,75 70 40 86 
Notes: Bold: Not included in exchange solution. 
Italics: Acceptance by unanimity. 
Normal: majority, including the largest stakeholder. 
Double number: Majority for first, excluding the largest stakeholder. 
wanted the freedom to be limited strongly (position 0). A third important issue 
concerned guarantees for a minimum level of the benefits (the higher the position, 
the higher the guarantee). A fourth issue concerned the level of another social 
benefit, in the table denoted "Exchange Issue." The client introduced this issue 
explicitly as his supply issue and chose to adopt a low position initially that could 
be changed during the negotiations. An external advisor from an organization 
with a much experience in this subject area advised to include another issue in the 
exchange process, denoted "Alternative Exchange Issue" in Table 4. This would 
have been very risky, as any concession on this issue would have been very 
expensive for the client. Moreover, the issue is normally dealt with in another 
negotiation context. The client's position was 0 (no change) against position 100 
supported by all other stakeholders (resulting in extra benefits). The client aimed 
at an outcome of the negotiation process that was not only close to his positions 
but was broadly supported as well. 
The row "Outcome Before Exchange, No Optimization" contains the outcomes 
predicted by the computer simulations when all issues are dealt with in isolation. 
These are the predicted outcomes on the basis of the aforementioned challenge 
strategy. They are obtained in different iterations without optimization aiming at 
outcomes closer to the positions of the client or at broader support. The predicted 
outcome on the main issue implies no change in the system or only in the long run. 
The outcomes on the other issues are also far from the preferred positions of the 
client. Under this scenario, the best course of action for the client would be to call 
a halt to the decision-making process immediately. 
The row "Challenge at Main Issue, Rest through Exchange" gives the outcomes 
with an optimal challenge strategy on the main issue combined with an exchange 
process over all remaining issues. With optimization we were able to arrive at a 
computer prediction of 70 for the main issue, corresponding to implementation 
for all new employees. The optimization consisted of a carefully selected leverage 
the client should show in combination with certain challenges the client would 
likely miss (and were indeed surprising for him). The exchange outcomes on the 
other four issues are not very promising. None of the predictions corresponds with 
his position. He has to give up a lot on the other issues in return for a better result 
on the Alternative Exchange Issue that has a high salience for him because of the 
large costs involved. Even then, he has to make a huge concession on that issue. 
The next row, "Best Exchange on First Three Issues," shows the results of a 
strategy that produces broadly supported outcomes close to the positions of the 
client. In this solution the Alternative Exchange Issue is entirely left out of the 
decision-making process. In isolation from the other issues, the issue cannot be 
solved. The best solution would be to exclude the issue entirely from the decision 
making. The main argument for its exclusion is the other negotiation platform to 
which it belongs. Our analysis therefore showed that the advice of the external 
advisor to include this issue was really very disadvantageous for the client. We 
advised that the decision on the issue Choice Elements should be made after nego- 
tiations on the first three issues had taken place. Choice Elements is the only non- 
financial issue. Moreover, the outcomes on the first three issues have to be known 
before one can make sensible decisions on this issue. Using an optimized chal- 
lenge strategy the issue could be resolved according to the position of the client. 
By using an exchange strategy, broadly supported outcomes close to the positions 
of the client were obtained on the first three issues. 
In the last rows of the table the results are shown of alternative strategies in 
which more issues are included in the exchange. All these strategies produce 
worse results than the strategy "Best Exchange on First Three Issues." Therefore, 
we recommended that strategy and the client implemented it successfully. This 
example demonstrates the power and fruitfulness of our approach. 
CHANGING THE DECISION SETTING 
The management of meaning, challenge, and exchange strategies take a decision 
setting as given. The setting corresponds to the specification of the issue(s) and 
the stakeholders with their capabilities, positions, and salience. If none of the 
strategies is effective and the issues are essential to obtain higher ordered objec- 
tives, a stakeholder can deliberate on whether the setting itself could be changed 
for better goal attainment. Stakeholders are inclined to pose this question more 
forcefully when they, time and time again, do not succeed in obtaining their 
objectives or when the decision-making process is blocked repeatedly by funda- 
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mental controversies. The approach presented above focuses directly on how to 
realize such a change in the decision setting. 
As the stakeholders with their power, positions, and salience determine the 
decision-making setting, strategies to change the decision setting can best be eval- 
uated on their likely effects on the distribution of these three variables. 
The combination of position and salience of the stakeholders is connected with 
the incentive structures of the stakeholders. Changing the incentive structures is 
consequently the most important point of departure to obtaining fundamental 
changes in position and salience of certain stakeholders. Assume, for example, 
that the cooperation of farmers is essential for the success of an environmental 
policy concerning the disposal of manure, and that they are not prepared to coop- 
erate freely or to accept certain policy measures. Their position and salience can 
then be influenced by a tax system that shifts their short-term economic interests 
in the direction of a more environment-friendly way of farming. This will lead to 
another stance of the farmers on issues related to manure policy (Baarda 1999). 
An important part of the power distribution between stakeholders is related to 
institutional arrangements. Long-lasting deprivation of certain stakeholders often 
results in a demand for institutional change, for example, through changes in the 
composition of bodies and advisory committees, changes in competencies 
between bodies, extension or reduction of possibilities for appeal. Changes in 
institutional arrangements and customs are therefore the most important ways to 
change the power distribution among stakeholders. In addition, other, more infor- 
mal capabilities can be increased or diminished. One can think of alliances, take- 
overs, or even mergers that can shift the power balance considerably. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have demonstrated that far-reaching insights into the decision-making process 
can be obtained from a correct problem decomposition, a decomposition resulting 
in a few main controversial issues, and a proper specification of the decision set- 
ting (stakeholders with their capabilities, positions, and salience). These insights 
concern the processes and the likely outcomes of the process, but also the amount 
of conflict involved and the stability of the outcomes. These insights are obtained 
by combining a systematic decomposition of the problem into main issues with 
systematic interviews of subject area specialists and computer simulation. In these 
computer simulation models not all aspects of the decision-making process are 
represented, but only the main processes through which differences in positions 
and saliences are accommodated in binding decisions. In our view, three main 
processes are at stake: management of meaning through the provision of convinc- 
ing information, challenges, and exchanges. In the provision of convincing infor- 
mation, trust and credibility play a dominant role. These conditions prevail among 
stakeholders with rather similar positions, between stakeholders with bridgeable 
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power differences, and in situations where the poslrlons are not yet fixed and still 
have to be formed. In contrast, in challenge strategies stakeholders purposively 
exploit power differences to build coalitions. In exchange processes large differ- 
ences in interests prevail, not only in terms of extreme opposing positions but also 
in terms of the priority rankings of the issues. 
Important strategic advantages can be gained from the insights generated by 
such an analysis. They can be used to obtain a better representation of one's own 
position in the decision outcome, and also to broaden the political and social sup- 
port behind the decision outcome. With respect to challenge strategies, the effects 
of increasing or reducing leverage and of taking a more extreme or moderate posi- 
tion can be investigated. Moreover, warnings against often occurring mispercep- 
tions are generated, misperceptions resulting from differences between 
stakeholders' attitudes toward risks that are often neglected. For exchange strate- 
gies, the effects of linking or excluding issues, of differences in prioritization, and 
of built-in change can be investigated. These are fundamental new insights in col- 
lective decision-making processes that have been generated by the social sciences 
since the beginning of the eighties. This has resulted in a shift of attention from 
questions about power differences to differences in the effects of power differ- 
ences. These effects are context dependent. It is the combination of the power dis- 
tribution over positions and the differences in leverage of the stakeholders that 
co-determines the setting. It is this combination that conditions the effects of 
power differences (Mokken et al. 1998). 
The approach presented above has passed the experimental phase. The team of 
scholars around Bueno de Mesquita and the Dutch group analyzed more than 
6,000 issues. In the United States the first applications were related to American 
foreign policy, but gradually the emphasis has switched toward business applica- 
tions. In the Netherlands the method has been applied for several ministries, large 
municipalities, and large companies for the analysis of complicated and important 
issues. Time and time again the clients indicated that they obtained many new 
insights through the approach and that they were able to realize their objectives 
more than they expected to do. Many clients returned for advice on other prob- 
lems. 
Important scientific questions remain. Within the domain of collective decision 
making a further analysis of the three processes continues. The conditions under 
which each process is dominant is one of the main questions to be answered (see 
also Achterkamp 1999). This is of particular importance because some of these 
processes are based on cooperative strategies, whereas others are based on con- 
flictual strategies. Under what conditions do we need to be prepared for conflict 
strategies and what macro effects do such conflictual strategies have? Do they 
result in other and worse outcomes from the perspective of social welfare? Do 
noncooperative strategies lead* longer and more difficult decision-making pro- 
cesses? Is it possible and desirable to add complexity to the models? How do these 
models relate to other models, such as coalition and pure game theoretic models? 
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From the perspective of societal relevance, the conditions for broadly supported 
outcomes are of central importance. The approach described above enables much 
more sophisticated research to be conducted on this question, thus contributing to 
research with a view to the enhancement of social cohesion and solidary behavior. 
In addition, central questions remain concerning the relation between collective 
decision making and other processes. The models make intensive use of insights 
from game theory, social psychology, and economics. Nevertheless, further 
investigation of the relationship between these areas in general, and individual 
and collective decision making in particular could well result in important new 
insights. Such research could help to derive positions and salience on issues from 
the incentive structures of stakeholders. Research on the weight of the different 
power components in the overall power or capability index of a stakeholder could 
provide fundamental insights to be used in the design of institutional arrange- 
ments in society. All these questions belong to the central questions of the social 
sciences and cross several disciplinary boundaries. Answers to these questions 
will likely have huge societal impact and utility. 
1. This paper is based on insights gained during the long-term development of the methodology 
described here, and applications of collective decision-making models. The roots of this development 
can be found in Mokken and Stokman (1976). Part of the methodology is based on a model developed 
by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita of Stanford University. The collaboration with him has been very inspir- 
ing and helped in developing our own contributions. Many insights originate from scientific applica- 
tions, mainly within the context of PhD projects in the Dutch Interuniversity Research Institute and 
Graduate School ICS. Commercial applications of the methodology by DECIDE bv helped signifi- 
cantly in the systematic analysis and testing of the effectiveness of strategic moves. DECIDE bv is a 
company associated with the University of Groningen and the ICS. We thank Robert Thomson for cor- 
recting the English. 
2. Wherever we use the male form, we also imply the female one. 
3. A good illustration of the accuracy of the models was given in 1996. At the start of the labor 
negotiations in the Dutch metal industry (July 1996) Maurice Rojer and the first author collected data 
on 16 controversial issues and publicly announced that we had given our predictions in a sealed enve- 
lope to a notary. At the end of the negotiations in September we opened the envelope at a press con- 
ference. One issue was held in study. Of the other 15 issues we predicted 13 correctly according to 
sharp criteria (87%). Among these 13 were exact predictions of the salary increase and the changes in 
the retirement arrangements, two of the most controversial issues. 
4. All models discussed in this paper assume that the issues are unidimensional and that the stake- 
holders have single-peaked preference functions. 
5. In our management of meaning model, three parameters are estimated for policy networks. The 
first parameter is related to the overall density of influence relations, the second to the difficulty to sur- 
mount power differences in establishing influence relations, and the third to the importance of similar- 
ity of positions on issues in establishing influence relations (Van Assen and Stokman forthcoming). If 
no network data are available (only the capability, position, and salience scores of the stakeholders on 
the issues), the model can be used to estimate the network effects and the effects on the outcomes of 
the issues of different values of the parameters. 
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6. The term leverage is used to refer to the strategically chosen salience in decision-making pro- 
cesses. For a model that optimizes the leverage over a set of issues, see Stokman and Stokman (1995). 
7. The exchange process as described and modeled is an example of a cooperative game model. 
The analysis of win-sen is an example of a noncooperative game through which stakeholders can cre- 
ate win-win situations. Win-sets are solely based on an analysis of the positions of the stakeholders. 
They do not take salience into account. 
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